31: Megha Ralapati

What are the roles of contracts? What are other ways that we make agreements with participants?

 

To consider this question, I’d like to think about tanda, a term for rotating credit associations that operate among Chicanas and Latinas in the U.S. Though the practice originated in Mexico, like other similar informal financial systems around the world, tandas are active in the diaspora communities immigrants have established outside of Mexico, particularly in Southern California and various parts of the Southwest.[1]

Here’s how they work: a group of women get together and pool a fixed amount of money each month for as many months as there are people in the group. At the end of each month, one person receives the kitty to spend as they please. If 10 people each contribute $100 each month, over the course of 10 months each person will receive $1000 at some point. I should also mention that group members are sometimes strangers. It’s essentially a no-interest loan given and received among strangers.

Given that group members are sometimes unknown to each other, the process seems incredibly risky. Someone can dutifully contribute $100 each month, hoping to receive the payout only to discover that someone else has run off with the kitty before her turn. On the other hand, if each woman contributes $100 for 10 months only to receive $1000, why wouldn’t she stash away $100 monthly into a far less risky cookie jar in the kitchen to be cashed out with the same financial result?

Tanda, also called cundina, may or may not follow contemporary financial logic, though this is exactly what makes it work. A key element at play is the dynamic among group members. Strangers or not, after 10 months of pooling funds and successfully producing and dispensing cash, participants develop faith in this system and each other, which is ultimately reliant on trust. And, trust among strangers (trustworthy strangers) can be very potent. With each successful month, trust accrues as group members develop their own positive reputations. If someone misses a payment, they aren’t accountable to an anonymous bank; instead, they have to answer to people they have let down.

In tanda, there is no formal contract to sign, nor default letter if payments are missed. Instead, the system relies on social agreements, informal contracts that are invisible and intangible. These are non-legal, non-monetary agreements that ultimately behave in a fashion as binding as a formal contract or possibly more so. Why? Tanda, and other similar systems, are based on a form of reciprocity not unlike gift giving, in which the activity itself ensures its perpetuation. If one member gives the “gift” of her contribution to the group, others are more likely to do so and not default: to return the gift of their own participation.

Written contracts are commitments that are meant to be binding; however, they suggest that the people involved do not actually trust each other and require a formal, legal, external device to manufacture the trust. The danger is that as soon as the contract is removed, the trust disappears. With systems like tanda, it’s clear from the outset what is expected of each member, with little room to fudge, and it’s up to each group member to either participate in good faith or not; to behave in a trustworthy or untrustworthy fashion. In the way a handshake symbolizes mutual agreement, these deals (also called implicit or relational contracts[2]) though informal, provide a useful guide when thinking about the contracts that circulate among and between players in the field of socially engaged practice. Many of the contracts among artists, participants, broader publics, and institutions are not meant to be transactional (explicit and equal trading of services). Instead, an agreement’s strength and sustainability relates to the trust that circulates among participants within an ongoing project or art practice. The relationships and contracts between these entities are dynamic and always in the process of making and remaking.

Some examples include:

Artist to Artist           Shared studio space
Institution to Artist  Invitation to a residency or exhibition
Artist to Public          Participation in project
Institution to Public Invitation to enter a space

Successful contracts tend to be those which have the fewest rules, either to be abided by or broken and in which all parties ultimately rely on their good judgment and faith in the partnership. I should note that formal contracts can be useful at the outset to establish a relationship, set up guidelines and expectations when partners and participants first enter an agreement; though, over time as the agreement continues, its strength and mutuality depends on the unwritten, unspoken elements that develop to insulate and support the original contract. If removed, the system should still be able to function nimbly.

The focus here is developing an idea of genuine participation on the part of all involved; that each will act in good faith and use her best judgment to make any decision. Over time, the “negotiating” and successful completion of the agreement builds trust, which fortifies and supports the system. Additionally, it establishes another key component, which is reputation. In sharing economies, for which I would include both tanda and many socially engaged art practices, reputation is paramount, and arguably becomes an even more valuable currency than money.[3] Previously, I mentioned that tanda doesn’t follow contemporary financial sense, with its emphasis on unspoken and potential risky “handshake” agreements; however, this type of deal is not new. It is exactly the unwritten nature of these deals that ensures them. As we continue to build communities based on shared notions of property and responsibility, it seems possible that we might return to such old-fashioned, pre-modern notions of working together and being together to discover that they do, in fact, still work.

 

Mierle Laderman Ukeles, “Handshake Ritual” (1978-80) with workers of New York City Department of Sanitation. (Accessed from Ronald Feldman Gallery).

 


[1] Gama, Rosalba, Delma Medrano, and Luis Medrano, “Tandas and Cundinas: Mexican-American and Latino-American Rotating Credit Associations in Southern California,” University of California at Irvine, accessed April 10, 2014, http://www.anthropology.uci.edu/~wmmaurer/courses/anthro_money_2004/Tandas.htm.
[2] For a more in-depth discussion of relational contracts, see:Helper, Susan and Rebecca Henderson, “Management Practices, Relational Contracts and the Decline of General Motors” (working paper published by Harvard Business School, 28 January 2014). Retrieved: http://hbswk.hbs.edu/item/7448.html
[3] For more here, see: Botsman, Rachel, “Welcome to the new reputation economy,” Wired, August 20, 2012. Retrieved: http://www.wired.co.uk/magazine/archive/2012/09/features/welcome-to-the-new-reputation-economy


About the contributor: Megha Ralapati is an independent curator, writer, and researcher interested in the contemporary moment within Visual Culture as it relates to art practice, networks and the effects of globalization. She was formerly director of Bose Pacia in New York and has developed curatorial projects including A Perfect Human at Dorsch Gallery in Miami (2009), Double-Jointed at Scaramouche gallery in New York (2012), and contributed to New Narratives: Contemporary Art from India at the Chicago Cultural Center (2007). She has presented at theAsian/Pacific/American Institute at NYU (New York 2013), School of the Art Institute (Chicago 2014), Eyebeam Art + Technology Center (New York 2012) and as a participant at the Incheon Biennial (Korea 2011). Megha received a BA in Art History and Anthropology from Columbia University (2004) and an MA in Visual Culture from Goldsmiths (2010) with a focus on informal financial networks. She is a contributing editor at ArtAsiaPacific and currently manages an international residency program at the Hyde Park Art Center in Chicago.